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I. INTRODUCTION
Together, Division I-A football and Division I men's basketball make up
what is commonly referred to as "big-time college sports."' Unfortunately,
the intensely commercial nature of big-time college sports presents a constant
threat to the National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) most sacred
* J.D., University of Virginia School of Law (2001). The author would like to thank Earl C. Dudley
and Craig K. Littlepage for their invaluable insight and assistance.
I. ALLEN L. SACK & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKY, COLLEGE ATHLETEs FOR HIRE: THE EVOLUTION
AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA's AMATEuR MYTH 1 (1998).
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principle: amateurism. 2 The NCAA's strict amateurism regulations have long
been criticized as exploitive, 3 hypocritical, 4 and unenforceable. 5 To address
these issues, Division I legislators6 are currently debating amateurism
deregulation proposals that would allow student-athletes to accept certain
forms of compensation and to engage in brief professional careers without
forfeiting NCAA eligibility.7
This article examines the synergy between NCAA amateurism
deregulation and the National Basketball Association's (NBA) fledgling
National Basketball Development League (NBDL). It posits that amateurism
deregulation coupled with the NBDL will provide a much-needed catalyst for
restoring educational primacy to college basketball. 8  Although the
forthcoming analysis may be applied to a variety of college sports, this
2. Orion Riggs, The Facade of Amateurism: The Inequities of Major-College Athletics, 5 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 141 (1996). The NCAA's principle of amateurism states:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated
primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.
NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2000-01 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 2.9 (2000)
[hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
3. DICK DEVENZIO, RIP-OFF U: THE ANNUAL THEFT AND EXPLOITATION OF MAJOR COLLEGE
REVENUE PRODUCING STUDENT-ATHLETES 132 (1986). See also ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID
PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 37 (1999).
4. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 1, at 47 (noting that athletic scholarships violate the
NCAA's amateurism principle).
5. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 25-26.
6. During the NCAA's restructuring, Division I abandoned the one-school/one-vote principle in
favor of a conference-based representation structure dominated by the major conferences. NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 2, at arts. 4.2.1, 4.5.1; Division I Governance Structure and Committees and
Cabinet Rosters, NCAA.ORG, at http://www.ncaa.org/databases/governancestructure/dl/index.html
(last visited Jan. 27, 2002). Although some legislative proposals are still circulated to the
membership for comment, absent a legislative override, the membership no longer votes directly on
legislation. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at arts. 5.3.2.3, 5.3.6. Instead, a committee and cabinet
structure evaluates and comments on legislative proposals before they are submitted to the
management council or board of directors for final approval. See, e.g., AEC Cabinet Amends
Amateurism Package, NCAA NEWS, Mar. 12, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter AEC Cabinet Amends]. Despite
the increased efficiency of the new governance structure, institutions without representatives on the
committees and cabinets report feeling disenfranchised by the new process. Welch Suggs, NCAA
Creates Panel to Review its Governance Structure, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 2, 2001, at A44.
7. Gary T. Brown, Councils Set Stage for Policy Changes in Each Division, NCAA NEWS, Apr.
23, 2001, at 1.
8. The principle of educational primacy requires that a student-athlete's status as a student take
precedence over his or her status as an athlete. John R. Allison, Rule-Making Accuracy in the NCAA
and its Member Institutions: Do Their Decisional Structures and Process Promote Educational
Primacy for the Student Athlete?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1995) (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 2, at arts. 1.3.1, 2.5, 41.01-.13).
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article's scope will be limited to Division I men's basketball.
Part II of this article introduces the organizational structure of
intercollegiate athletics. Part III discusses the primary threats to educational
primacy in college athletics programs. This section explains how competitive
pressure, commercialism, and professionalism have caused many elite college
athletics programs to lose sight of the primary purpose of colleges and
universities.
Part IV introduces the potential guardians of educational primacy in
college athletics programs. Included among this group are colleges and
universities, conferences, the NCAA, legislatures, and the judicial system.
This section describes the role undertaken by each of these institutions in
ensuring that student-athletes receive a meaningful education.
Part V evaluates the practicality and potential impact of two Division I
amateurism deregulation proposals: (1) pay-for-play and (2) former
professional eligibility. It argues that Division I should adopt the latter
proposal, which would allow athletes with brief professional sports careers to
retain NCAA eligibility. Under this proposal, former professionals would lose
one season of eligibility and would be required to satisfy one academic year in
residence before they could participate in intercollegiate competition. 9 In
effect, this requirement would compel both the athlete and the university to
make a substantial and immediate investment in the athlete's educational
development. Hence the former professional eligibility proposal would
enhance educational primacy to a greater extent than the pay-for-play
proposal, which merely addresses athletes' financial needs.
Part VI demonstrates how Division I amateurism deregulation and the
NBDL will interact to bolster the principle of educational primacy. It argues
that the NBDL would be the better choice for those college-aged athletes
intending to pursue a professional basketball career. As a result, the NBDL
and college teams will inevitably become competitors for the limited pool of
elite college-aged basketball players. When given the choice between college
and NBDL basketball, those players that choose college would be implicitly
9. Gary T. Brown, Councils Take Philosophical Approach to Major Issues, NCAA NEWS, July
31, 2000, available at http:llwww.ncaa.orglnews/2000/2000073 l/active/3716n0l.html.
To satisfy an academic year in residence, a student must:
(a) Be enrolled in and complete a minimum full-time program of studies for two full semesters or three
full quarters; or
(b) Be enrolled in a minimum full-time program of studies for two full semesters or three full quarters and
pass a number of hours that is at least equal to the sum total of the minimum load of each of the required
terms.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 14.5.1.1.
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demonstrating their commitment to education. Moreover, former professional
eligibility would allow similarly committed athletes with short-lived NBDL
careers to retain the opportunity to attend college on an athletic scholarship.
The NBDL will signal the end of Division I's privileged status as the de
facto minor league of the NBA. As the preferred route to the NBA, the NBDL
could substantially decrease the quality of the talent pool from which colleges
choose their athletes. To curb the loss of revenue that could occur as the
quality of the college game deteriorates, college basketball programs will need
to devise ways to compete with the NBDL for elite young athletes. Yet the
financial limitations of college athletics programs will prevent them from
offering student-athletes the equivalent of a NBDL salary. Therefore, this
article concludes that the most viable response to competition from the NBDL
involves allowing college basketball players to obtain more value from the
collegiate experience.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF
COLLEGE ATHLETICS
Colleges and universities providing athletics programs typically belong to
regional and national governing bodies that provide administrative, legislative,
and promotional support for their members. Conferences provide this support
at the regional level. At the national level, this support is provided by either
the NCAA or the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics.' 0 This
article's analysis will be limited to the NCAA, the most influential regulator of
college athletics.
Although the NCAA's principle of institutional control requires university
presidents to assume ultimate responsibility for athletics programs,'1 this
authority is usually delegated to the institution's athletics director, 12 who
10. MICHAEL E. JONES, SPORTS LAW 2 (1999).
11. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 2.1. The principle of institutional responsibility and
control states:
It is the responsibility of each member institution to control its intercollegiate athletics program in
compliance with the rules and regulation of the Association. The institution's chief executive officer is
responsible for the administration of all aspects of the athletics program, including approval of the budget
and audit of all expenditures.
... The institution's responsibility for the conduct of its intercollegiate athletics program includes
responsibility for the actions of its staff members and for the actions of any other individual or
organization engaged in activities promoting the athletics interests of the institution.
Id.
12. JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: A
UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT'S PERSPECTIVE 110 (2000).
[Vol. 12:595
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reports to either the university president or a vice president.13 Coaches and
administrative staff in the athletics department report to the athletics director
14
whose daily responsibilities may include generating revenue in addition to
managing facilities, media relations, and academic affairs. 15 Therefore, in
reality, the athletics director bears most of the burden for assuring that the
athletics department's goals remain consistent with the overall purpose of the
university.
University presidents also delegate responsibilities for their athletics
programs to collegiate conferences. 16 In most major conferences, university
presidents serve as the board of directors, which ultimately retains authority
over conference operations. 17 Historically, conferences existed primarily to
provide schools with a reliable source of competitors. 18  The modem
conference's operations include monitoring compliance with conference and
NCAA policies, managing conference championships, structuring
broadcasting contracts, and redistributing revenues. 19  The conference's
commissioner either oversees or performs these functions.
20
Despite its voluntary nature, the NCAA is the leading regulatory body for
intercollegiate athletics. Formed in 1906 with only 39 charter members,21 the
NCAA now consists of over 1200 institutions, conferences, and
organizations.22 The association is divided into three major membership
categories: Division I, II, and 11.23 Schools with football programs are further
subdivided into Divisions I-A and I-AA.24 In 1997, the NCAA restructured its
13. Id. at 102.
14. Id. at 111.
15. Id. at 111-112.
16. Id. at 115. Conferences are comprised of academic institutions sharing common competitive
philosophies. JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAm G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS
AND EDUcATIONAL VALUES 16 (2001).
17. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 124.
18. SHuLMAN&BOWEN, supranote 16, at 16.
19. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 116.
20. Id. at 117.
21. Part I: 1900-39 -NCAA Charter Members, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 8, 1999, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/1999/19991108/active/3623n29.html.
22. What is the NCAA?, NCAA.ORG, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/what-is-the ncaa.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2002).
23. What's the Difference Between Divisions I, II, and III?, NCAA.ORG, at
http://www.ncaa.orglabout/div._criteria.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). The divisions are generally
distinguishable by the number of sports sponsored, scheduling and attendance requirements, academic
and eligibility standards, and the amount of financial aid authorized by the NCAA. Id. Division I
represents the highest level of play and, as such, its members must meet the NCAA's most stringent
membership requirements. Id.
24. Id.
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organizational scheme to provide for greater divisional autonomy. 25 As a
result, each division now has its own governing body.26
III. THREATS TO EDUCATIONAL PRIMACY
The United States stands alone in combining higher education with
athletic development. 27 College athletics programs offer countless benefits to
sponsoring institutions and participating students. At the institutional level,
college athletics can play a role in increasing the institution's visibility 28 and
unifying the university community. 29 Furthermore, these programs generate
revenues from a variety of sources, including gate receipts, corporate
sponsorships, and television rights fees.30 At the student level, athletics
programs can provide educational opportunities for students who otherwise
could not afford to attend college. Participation in college athletics can also
facilitate the development of valuable attributes such as, leadership,
competitiveness, discipline, and teamwork. 31  To reap these and other
substantial benefits, colleges and universities pour millions of dollars into their
athletics programs. Ideally, all college athletics programs would place
student-athletes' educational priorities first. Yet in practice, this does not
occur. Under the current regime, competitive pressure to win games,
commercialism, and professionalism often lead to the subordination of
educational primacy. To understand how amateurism deregulation and the
NBDL will interact to bolster educational primacy, one must first understand
the problems of the current regime. To this end, the earlier sections of this
article provide an in-depth description of these problems.
25. Governance Structure, NCAA.ORG, at http://www.ncaa.org/databases/govemancestructure/
(last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
26. Id.
27. Welch Suggs, As More Coaches Recruit Foreign Talent, All-Americans Aren't Always
American, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 6, 2001, at A50. In Europe, professional clubs sponsor
youth teams where participants gradually ascend towards the foreign equivalent of a U.S. professional
team. MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS. THE
UNIVERSITY 236 (1990).
28. E.g., DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 8.
29. Id. at 10. Contra MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: How BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS
IS CRIPPLING UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION 255 (2000).
30. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 134.
31. SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 16, at 3. An empirical study conducted by Shulman and
Bowen found that athletes were no more likely to provide leadership than their non-athlete peers. Id.
at 265.
[Vol. 12:595
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A. Competitive Pressure
Successful basketball teams generate millions of dollars in revenue from
ticket sales, guarantees, payouts from tournaments, television rights fees,
licensed merchandise, and corporate sponsorships. 32 Additional benefits
thought to accrue to athletically successful schools include additional tuition
and fees from increased enrollments33 and an increase in alumni donations. 34
However, when costs enter the equation, the vast majority of universities lose
money on athletics programs. 35  Still, many programs subscribe to the
philosophy that "the team that spends the most wins the most."'36
When the team wins consistently, coaches reap substantial benefits from
the team's success. This occurs because, increasingly, coaches' job security
and base salaries are tied to their competitive records.37 In addition to high
base salaries, successful coaches might also receive home loans, automobiles,
deferred compensation, and bonuses for winning.38 Winning coaches can
further supplement their university income with income from shoe contracts,
sports camps, and appearances on radio and television talk shows.39
Competitive pressure constitutes the first major threat to educational
primacy. Competitive pressure may be generated either internally by
inherently competitive coaches or externally by the financial incentives to win
games. But regardless of its origin, this pressure eventually trickles down to
student-athletes. 40 As such, the pressure to win, if left unchecked, usually
manifests itself in ways that seriously conflict with the principle of educational
primacy. That is, perverse incentives at either the institutional or coach level
can result in the intentional subordination of educational primacy. This
section addresses coaches' ability to effectuate this subordination.
32. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 112-114, 136, 147.
33. E.g., DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 9 (noting that each time the University of Michigan
appears in the Final Four or Rose Bowl, admissions applications surge).
34. Contra SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 16, at 255 (discussing the lack of evidence to
support the proposition that an institution's athletic success stimulates alumni giving).
35. NCAA Fact Sheet, NCAA.ORG (revealing that average total expenses exceed average total
revenues in all divisions except Division I-A), at http://www.ncaa.org/about/factsheet.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2002).
36. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 128.
37. SPERBER, supra note 27, at 194-195.
38. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 80-81.
39. See, e.g., id. (detailing the compensation packages of several celebrity coaches).
40. A participant in a study on role conflict among college basketball players wrote that, "in
college the coaches be a lot more concerned on winning and the money comin' in. If they don't win,
they may get the boot, and so they pass that pressure onto us athletes." SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra
note 1, at 101.
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Many basketball players enter college academically deficient.4 1 Add to
this deficiency, forty to sixty hours per week of athletic activities, and missed
classes, and the result is an athlete unlikely to graduate. In fact, only forty-
three percent of all NCAA basketball players graduate within six years42 and,
of those athletes who do graduate, many do not receive a meaningful degree.43
As a result, some critics condemn Division I basketball programs for
exploiting athletes until the end of their eligibility and then summarily
discarding them.44 This exploitation is often facilitated by coaches, who exert
considerable influence over the administrative processes governing student-
athlete affairs. The areas in which coaches may exert the most influence are
admissions, financial aid, and academic services.
To build and sustain successful programs, coaches frequently recruit
student-athletes that fall decisively below their schools' regular admissions
standards. 45 Athletes who fail to meet a school's regular admissions standards
may still be admitted through "special" or "wild-card" admissions processes. 46
The "wild card" admissions process gives a coach a limited number of "no
questions asked" admits.47 Therefore, the wild card process places the admit
decision completely within the coach's discretion, limited only by NCAA
eligibility standards. "Special admissions" is the process by which the
admissions office 48 admits athletes who, although they do not meet the
school's regular admissions standards, enrich the student body nonetheless. 49
Although this process is also available to legacies, musicians, and other
41. See generally Jim Naughton, Athletes Lack Grades and Test Scores of Other Students,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 25, 1997, at A43-44.
42. Welch Suggs, College Basketball on the Line, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 26, 1999, at
A54. Contrastingly, 56% of all students and 58% of all athletes received their degrees in six years
during that time period. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 37.
43. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 39 (noting that, as a quantitative measure, graduation rates do
not speak to the quality of athletes' academic careers).
44. Adam S. Taylor & M. Darren Traub, Cureton v. NCAA: Scrutinizing Proposition 16 and the
Consequences of Its Disparate Impact on Minority Student-Athletes, 7 SPoRTS L.J. 59, 63 (2000).
Some commentators argue that, regardless of whether or not athletes graduate, they derive substantial
educational benefits from merely having been exposed to institutions of higher education. Vic
Feuerherd, Big Ten Tourney Should Proceed with Caution, WIS. STATE J., Dec. 22, 1996, at ID.
45. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 193.
46. Id. at 193-94.
47. Id. (revealing that coaches at many institutions negotiate for a predetermined number of wild
card admits, thereby enabling the coaches to more confidently recruit the very best athletes).
48. Special admissions decisions may still be heavily influenced by coaches. Id. at 195 (noting
that a coach might give the admissions office a list of students with the understanding that they will
be admitted).
49. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 1, at 99.
[Vol. 12:595
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students with desirable characteristics,50 a study conducted in 1991 shows that
football and men's basketball players in elite sports programs are six times
more likely than other students to have been special admits.51
To successfully recruit a blue-chip athlete, a coach might find it necessary
to exaggerate the athlete's educational prospects. For example, in Ross v.
Creighton University,5 2 the coaching staff recruited Kevin Ross to play
basketball at "an academically superior university," despite his severely
deficient academic background.5 3 To obtain his commitment, Ross was
assured that he "would receive a meaningful education."5 4 Yet after four years
as a student-athlete, Ross dropped out of the university with the language
skills of a fourth grader.55 Under the NCAA's current rules, Ross would not
have met the initial eligibility standards and, therefore, he probably would not
have been admitted to Creighton.56
After an athlete enrolls in school, coaches can exert substantial influence
over the athlete's academic future. The key source of this influence resides in
a coach's ability to cancel an athlete's scholarship.5 7 Before the one-year
renewable athletic scholarship came into existence in 1973, athletes received
four-year scholarships that continued even after they withdrew from their
sports.5 8 Today, NCAA rules permit expedited cancellation for athletes who
voluntarily withdraw from their sports.5 9 Thus, cancellation power gives
coaches a powerful tool that can be used to alter a student-athlete's academic
priorities.
NCAA rules limit an athlete's participation in "countable athletically
50. Deirdre Carmody, Colleges Bend Admissions for More than Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1989, at B6.
51. Douglas Lederman, Special Admissions Treatment for Athletes Widespread at Big-Time-
Sports Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 1, 1991, at Al; see also Elliot Almond, Athletes Go to
the Front ofAdmission Line, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1991, at Cl.
52. 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
53. Id. at 411.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 412.
56. Ross scored nine out of thirty-six points on the ACT. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp.
1319, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affd in part, rev'd in part, 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992). The average
Creighton University student scored 23.2 points on the ACT in 1978, the year that Ross matriculated.
Id.
57. SPERBER, supra note 29, at 28.
58. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 1, at 83-84.
59. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 15.3.4.1(d). Athletic scholarships may be reduced or
canceled before the renewal period expires if the athlete withdraws from the sport for "personal
reasons." Id.
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related activities" 60 to four hours per day and twenty hours per week.6 1
However, many student-athletes complain that the "voluntary workout ' 62
exception swallows this rule.63 That is, to the extent that coaches use time
spent on voluntary workouts to determine an athlete's status on the team, the
workouts are not truly voluntary.64 Consequently, some athletes still spend
forty to sixty hours per week on their sports, which invariably limits the
amount of time that the athletes spend studying and attending classes.65
Given athletes' rigorous game and workout schedules, similarly
demanding academic programs would present a constant threat to NCAA
eligibility. This threat would be even more pronounced for marginal students.
To protect against the risk of an athlete becoming ineligible for competition,
coaches often steer athletes into less demanding majors or courses. 66 At some
schools, these less demanding majors might include general studies, physical
education, or sports management. 67 Although most athletics departments
provide extensive academic support services for student-athletes, in the
absence of sufficient time to indulge these services, even a hollow major can
threaten an athlete's eligibility. 68
When legitimate attempts to keep athletes on the court prove futile,
competitive pressure and perverse incentives can combine to produce
academic scandals, as was the case at the University of Minnesota from 1994
60. Id. at art. 17.02.1. Countable athletically related activities include any on-court activity,
chalk talk, strategy discussions, watching game films, and weight training. Id.
61. Id. at art. 17.1.5.1.
62. Id. at art. 17.02.1(h). Countable coaches may design general (as opposed to specific)
voluntary individual workout programs for student-athletes and the workouts would not count as
countable athletically related activities. Id. Furthermore, strength and conditioning coaches may
conduct voluntary workout programs and the workouts would not be considered countable athletically
related activities. Id. at art. 17.02.1 (1).
63. SPERBER, supra note 29, at 31. See also SAAC Enthusiastic in Support of Amateurism Rules
Changes, NCAA NEWS, July 3, 2000 (discussing a proposal by the NCAA's Student-athlete Advisory
Committee (SAAC) to more clearly define the meaning of "voluntary workout"), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20000703/active/3714n 1 3.html.
64. SPERBER, supra note 29, at 31 (alluding to coaches' use of voluntary workouts to determine
starting rosters).
65. Id. at 198.
66. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 199. Afternoon practice schedules further limit an athlete's
choice of major by restricting the athlete's ability to enroll in afternoon classes. SPERBER, supra note
29, at 244-245. These scheduling conflicts will be heightened as more schools shift from morning to
afternoon-heavy course offerings. See, e.g., Nancy Foshee, MCHS Faculty Defends Request, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), June 4, 1995, at B9.
67. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 195-196. A typical gut course-load might include
"ceramics, marksmanship, [or one of] the respective theories of basketball, track and field, [or]
football." Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1322.
68. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 199-200.
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through 1999.69 During this time period, the head men's basketball coach, an
academic counselor, and a secretary engaged in the most egregious academic
fraud that the NCAA Committee on Infractions had seen since the early
1980s.70  Specifically, with the head coach's knowledge, a secretary
completed four hundred assignments for student-athletes and the secretary's
sister, a tutor, authored forty-eight papers for student-athletes. 71 The NCAA's
institutional sanctions for these and other violations included placing the
university on probation for four years, vacating team and individual records,
and decreasing grants-in-aid, official visits, and evaluation opportunities in
men's basketball. 72 As for the wrongdoers, the head coach was forced to
resign and the contracts of his two accomplices were never renewed.
73
Often times, student-athletes must choose between athletic success and
academic success. Coaches substantially influence this choice through their
power to withdraw financial aid and playing time. To the extent that coaches
feel pressured to use their influence to push athletes to the borderline of
academic failure or fraud, the principle of educational primacy suffers along
with the university's academic reputation.
B. Commercialism
The commercial model of college athletics gives priority to the spectators'
entertainment needs, rather than to the student-athletes' educational needs.
74
Corporate sponsorships, broadcasting contracts, product value, and market
share dominate this model, where student-athletes and coaches are viewed as
entertainment products.75 The Final Four exemplifies the commercial model
of college athletics.
Commercialism constitutes the second major threat to educational
primacy. In addition to subordinating educational primacy, commercialism
increases the pressure to win. That is, dependence on revenues from gate
receipts, corporate sponsorships, and television contracts intensifies external
pressures to win. Furthermore, for "celebrity" teams, commercialism
intensifies the pressure to win by creating an expectation by fans that these
69. Infractions Case: University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, NCAA NEws, Nov. 6, 2000,
available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20001106/active/3723nl 8.html.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 152.
75. Id. at 76, 152.
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teams will continue their winning streaks indefinitely.76 As previously stated,
the pressure to win, regardless of its source, poses its own threat to educational
primacy. Critics of the commercial model of college athletics argue that,
besides increasing the pressure to win, commercialism encourages
academically intrusive scheduling and financially exploits student-athletes. 77
Media-driven schedules for athletic contests can assist in the subordination
of educational primacy. That is, mid-week and late-night games scheduled to
accommodate media demands often conflict with student-athletes' academic
obligations.78 For instance, bowl game scheduling forces athletes to practice
during final exam periods. 79 Moreover, the "Final Four" teams of the NCAA
tournament will miss at least three weeks of classes during March.80 Although
such academically intrusive schedules can maximize television revenues and
media exposure, these gains often come at the expense of the athletes'
academic success.
Commercialism also raises concerns of financial exploitation for student-
athletes. At most college games, corporate logos can be seen on uniforms,
hats, and scoreboards among other places. In 1995, sponsorship and signage
income for the average Division I-A school exceeded $450,000.81 The
prototypical sponsorship deal is the shoe contract,82 which provides athletes
with free sneakers and apparel, 83 and might also provide significant outside
income for college coaches. 84 In return, shoe companies receive millions of
dollars in television exposure for the logos displayed on players' shoes and
uniforms.85  Although these arrangements enrich athletics departments,
coaches, and sponsors, many student-athletes, whose incomes are restricted by
NCAA amateurism rules, feel that they are being exploited by such
76. Id. at 77.
77. Id. at 79-81.
78. Id. at 77.
79. SPERBER, supra note 29, at 38.
80. Id.
81. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 136.
82. Shoe companies, such as Nike and Adidas, also sponsor youth summer leagues and high
school teams. Id. at 138. Critics scorn these companies for using summer league and high school
sponsorships to undermine the college recruiting process. SPERBER, supra note 27, at 185. That is,
shoe companies sponsor youth summer league and high school teams primarily to establish and
perpetuate brand loyalty throughout the participants' athletic careers. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at
138. Once brand loyalty is established, the decisive factor for top recruits choosing among colleges
often boils down to shoe affiliation. Id. at 140. As a further incentive for top recruits to attend
affiliated colleges, a shoe company might also finance a recruit's campus visits. Id. at 139-40.
83. See, e.g., ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 137.
84. See, e.g, id. at 137-138.
85. Id. at 147.
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arrangements. 86
Few athletics departments generate sufficient revenue to cover the full cost
of their programs. 87 Although booster club donations, corporate sponsorships
and the like provide additional revenues for athletics departments, most
college athletics programs still require financial support from general
university funds.88 Sympathizers of commercialized college sports cite the
precarious financial condition of college athletics programs as support for the
present and continued commercialization of college athletics.89
86. Id. at 37. See also Sam Farmer, Union May Put Label on Colleges, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 18,
2001, at DI. Earlier this year, several former UCLA football players formed a union-like
organization called the College Athlete's Coalition to lobby for increased compensation for college
athletes. Id. The coalition, which is currently limited to football, plans to expand to basketball and
other sports prior to the close of the 2001-02 school year. Steve Wieberg, Players Want Cut of $6
Billion TV Contract, USA TODAY, Mar. 30,2001, at IA.
87. NCAA Fact Sheet, supra note 35, at http://www.ncaa.org/about/factsheet.html.
88. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 133. See also ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 150; SHuLMAN &
BOWEN, supra note 16, at 248-249 (estimating that at some private institutions, athletics programs
might receive subventions from university general funds of up to $12 million). At some universities,
state laws might restrict the use of state or university general funds to finance college athletics
programs. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 17 (Vernon 1995) (prohibiting the use of certain state
appropriations for facilities used solely for intercollegiate athletics); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-62-801
(Michie 2001) (requiring limitations on the use of university general funds to support intercollegiate
athletics programs); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 71-203 (2000) (prohibiting the use of public funds for
athletic scholarships); R-I. GEN. LAWS § 16-59-9 (2001) (requiring auxiliary facilities of public
universities to be self-supporting); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 17:2053 (West 2000) (prohibiting private
universities from using certain funds from the state for intercollegiate athletics purposes); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN § 17:3801 (West 2000) (prohibiting the use of state educational trust funds for
intercollegiate athletics purposes); OR. REV. STAT. § 341.009 (1999) (prohibiting state appropriations
for athletic facilities for spectator sports). Some universities provide subsidies to athletics programs
through related-party transactions, where expenses properly associated with the athletics department
are paid by other departments within the university. ZMBALIST, supra note 3, at 153. For example,
athletic scholarships might be paid from the financial aid office's budget or the debt service on
athletic facilities might be paid from the university's facilities budget. Id. See also Revenues and
Expenses Both on the Incline for Division I, I, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 6, 2000 (noting that an NCAA
study of athletics programs' operational expenses excluded the cost of debt services because the cost
was reflected "elsewhere" in university budgets), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/2000l106/active/3723nO4.html. In addition, some universities
provide athletics department subsidies through full or partial tuition waivers for athletes.
DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 139. See, e.g., 110 ILL. COM. STAT. 305/7g (2001) (authorizing
tuition waivers for athletes).
89. Timothy Davis, African-American Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory
Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 199, 216 (1996). Most Division I-A athletics departments are
considered "auxiliary enterprises" and, as such, are expected to generate revenues sufficient to cover
costs. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 87. Auxiliary enterprises are typically defined as:
[S]elf-supporting services provided at [colleges and universities] for which fees or charges are paid, and
includes but is not limited to food services, college stores, student unions, institutionally operated vending
services, recreational activities, faculty clubs, laundries, parking facilities, and intercollegiate athletics.
IOWA CODE § 260C.31 (2001).
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C. Professionalism
As early as the late-nineteenth century, the desire to produce winning
athletic teams led universities to seek out highly skilled athletes, many of
whom had little interest in academics. 90 In fact, some of these early college
athletes were not even students.91 In return for their athletic services, early
student-athletes received "scholarships, sinecure jobs, gifts from alumni and
citizens, and a hundred other types of financial compensation." 92  Current
NCAA amateurism rules forbid all but the first category of compensation for
student-athletes.
Modem universities attract athletes with promises of free tuition, room
and board, and academic support services. All of which are sanctioned by
NCAA regulations. 93 As an additional incentive, a few universities have
resorted to the use of prohibited "extra benefits" 94 to lure the best athletes. 95
The use of financial incentives in recruiting, whether NCAA-sanctioned or
prohibited, allows college teams to attract higher quality athletes, thereby
improving the teams' revenue potential. Yet recruiting such highly qualified
athletes also requires a corresponding commitment to provide the academic
services, coaching staffs, and facilities necessary to support these athletes. 96
The ability to provide the requisite support services helps to explain why well-
funded athletics programs generally field the most competitive teams.
Professionalism poses the third threat to educational primacy. As an
inherent form of pay-for-play, the athletic scholarship can be viewed as a
manifestation of the professionalism that characterizes "amateur" college
90. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 1, at 23-24.
91. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 7.
92. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 1, at 24.
93. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at arts. 15.01.7, 15.02.2.
94. Id. at art. 16.02.3. The definition of "extra benefit" states:
An extra benefit is any special arrangement by an institutional employee or a representative of the
institution's athletics interests to provide a student-athlete or the student-athlete's relative or friend a
benefit not expressly authorized by NCAA legislation. Receipt of a benefit by student-athletes or their
relatives or friends is not a violation of NCAA legislation if it is demonstrated that the same benefit is
generally available to the institution's students or their relatives or friends or to a particular segment of the
student body (e.g., foreign students, minority students) determined on a basis unrelated to athletics ability.
1d.
95. See, e.g., SPERBER, supra note 27, at 249-255 (discussing NCAA amateurism violations
involving extra benefits); Suggs, supra note 42 (discussing extra benefits received by college
basketball recruits); ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 24-25, 45-46 (detailing NCAA amateurism
violations involving extra benefits). Because NCAA rule violators typically do not admit their
violations unless compelled to do so, it is not possible to accurately determine the frequency of the
use of extra benefits. Id. at 45.
96. SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 16, at 231.
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athletics.97 Accordingly, educational primacy is subverted because student-
athletes cannot withdraw from their sports, even for academic reasons, without
suffering the detrimental economic consequences of such a decision.98
Further evidence of the professionalization of college sports lies in the fact
that college athletics programs have become training grounds for professional
sports careers. Indeed some athletes attend college for the sole purpose of
advancing their professional sports careers. 99  Professionalized college
athletics demand that its participants train and perform at the highest possible
level. These demands subvert educational primacy by requiring time
commitments that are often inconsistent with a student-athlete's student status.
In addition to weakening the principle of educational primacy, the
commercialized, professionalized model of college athletics can also be self-
defeating. That is, professionalized athletes usually abandon the team when
they reach a level of play sufficiently high to attract opportunities from major
professional leagues.
Competitive pressure, commercialism, and professionalism constitute the
three main threats to educational primacy. If left unchecked, these threats can
combine to overshadow the academic purpose of institutions of higher
education. The threats are interrelated in that commercialism intensifies
competitive pressure and competitive pressure encourages professionalism.
Hence, any attempt to safeguard the principle of educational primacy must
address all three of its major threats.
IV. GOVERNANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE EDUCATIONAL PRIMACY
The principle of educational primacy requires that a student-athlete's
status as a student take precedence over his or her status as an athlete.100 In
the world of college athletics, this principle competes with the demands of
competitive pressure, commercialism, and professionalism. Various
governance structures exist to safeguard the principle of educational primacy
against these competing interests. These structures may be divided into two
broad categories: (1) internal and (2) external. The internal governance
97. SACK & STAUROWVSKY, supra note 1, at 4.
98. Contra id.
99. For example, when Stephon Marbury, a Georgia Tech point guard, entered the NBA draft in
1996, he disclosed that he had attended college to "position [him]self for the [NBA] draft."
ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 39. Indeed, many athletes enter college intending to parlay their athletic
skills into a professional sports career. SPERBER, supra note 27, at 8. Larry Brown, who coached
basketball at Kansas and UCLA, remarked that he wanted all of his players to feel as though they had
the potential to play professionally. Peter Alfano, Basketball's 2 Stressful Worlds Offer Coaches a
Tough Choice, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1989, at 81.
100. Allison, supra note 8, at 5-6.
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structure consists of universities, conferences, and the NCAA, whereas the
legislature and courts comprise the external governance structure. External
involvement in the regulation of college athletics is very limited.
Consequently, college athletics is dominated by internal governance
structures, which are plagued by self-interest and conflicting goals.
A. Internal Governance
Internal governance of the principle of educational primacy has two main
benefits. First, internal governance saves the government the cost of
regulation. Second, internal governance structures can detect and remedy
problems more quickly than external governance structures. To the extent that
internal governance structures fail to adequately safeguard the principle of
educational primacy, external governance structures can provide a meaningful
oversight function.
The primary purpose of the university is education and, therefore, it is the
university's responsibility to provide an environment conducive to that
purpose.1 1 Ideally, athletics programs would peacefully coexist with the
university's primary purpose and would place educational priorities over those
of athletics. Yet, historically, university athletics programs have exhibited a
tendency to operate in opposition to the university's primary purpose.10 2
Self-interest and perverse incentives can prevent individual universities
from effectively policing the principle of educational primacy. College
admissions standards vary and, as previously noted, schools lower these
standards for elite athletes to build successful teams. Furthermore, universities
alone determine what constitutes good academic standing once a student
enrolls. 10 3 Thus, a school may relax both its admissions standards and its
standards for good academic standing to accommodate an athlete's
eligibility. 10 4 Lenient academic policies for student-athletes clearly conflict
with the goals of higher education. As a result, faculty members at some
institutions have banded together in an attempt to expose and reform these
policies. 10 5 However, institutional athletic interests have very little incentive
101. The University of Virginia's athletics department mission statement reads: "The mission of
the Department of Athletics is to enhance and support the intellectual purpose of the University and
its exemplary academic standards and traditions." UNIV. OF VA. DEP'T OF INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS, STUDENT-ATHLETE HANDBOOK 2000-2001 6 (2000).
102. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that as early as the late-1800s, student-
athletes were being relegated to the status of academic outsiders).
103. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 14.02.5.
104. See, e.g., Kemp v. Ervin, 651 F. Supp. 495,499 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
105. Don Jacobs, Professors to Discuss Conflict of Athletics, Academics, KNOXVILLE NEWS-
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to implement the reforms since doing so could place the schools at a recruiting
and competitive disadvantage.
Conferences share common eligibility standards, which might be higher
than those required by the NCAA. 10 6 To this extent, conferences can regulate
their members' academic standards to ensure that they do not fall to
unacceptable levels. However a conference that sets its academic standards
too high might find itself at a competitive disadvantage in inter-conference
competition.
In addition to the regulation of academic policies, conferences promote
their respective athletic contests and redistribute revenues among their
members. Historically, conference members aligned themselves because of
shared geography and competitive and academic philosophies. 0 7 More
recently, members' revenue potential has become the most important common
denominator.10 8 To maximize revenues, conferences become parties to
broadcasting contracts, 10 9 which often require academically intrusive
schedules. 110 Absent external pressure to do so, a single conference has very
little incentive to oppose its own policies regarding the scheduling of televised
athletic contests. To do so would decrease its revenue potential and hence its
attractiveness to present and future members.
Many of the NCAA's regulations support the principle of educational
primacy. The NCAA's principle of student-athlete welfare instructs member
institutions to promote an environment in which athletics programs are
"conducted as an integral part of the student-athlete's educational
experience."' 111  Moreover, the NCAA's principle of sound academic
standards requires member institutions to maintain student-athletes as "an
SENTINEL, Feb. 4,2001, atB1.
106. See, e.g., DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 219 (noting that the Big Ten's academic standards
are more rigorous than those required by the NCAA).
107. SHUJLMAN & BOwEN, supra note 16, at 16.
108. The addition of Florida State University to the Atlantic Coast Conference and the addition
of Penn State University to the Big Ten Conference illustrates this more recent phenomenon. Id.
109. The major football conferences are parties to an eight-year, $930 million contract with ABC
to televise the Bowl Championship Series. D. Stanley Eitzen, Slaves to Big-Time College Sports,
USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 2001 (Magazine), at 26.
110. See, e.g., John Swofford Fourth Full-time Commissioner Is In His Fourth Year at the Helm
of the ACC, THEACC.CoM (boasting that the ACC is the only conference in the country with games
on major networks at prime time on weeknights), at
http://theacc.fansonly.com/genrel/072999aaa.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). Participation in bowl
games often requires college football players to practice during their schools' final exam period.
SPERBER, supra note 29, at 38.
111. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 2.2.1.
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integral part of the student body."' 1 2 To assure that universities do not lower
their admissions criteria to predictably exploitive levels, the NCAA sets
national eligibility standards for incoming student-athletes."13 Although the
NCAA's academic rules and principles declare its support for the principle of
educational primacy, in practice, educational primacy has not been the
NCAA's main objective.
The NCAA also acts as a promoter and economic regulator of collegiate
athletics. Indeed, the promotion and economic regulation of college athletics
are the NCAA's dominant functions. In this capacity, the NCAA experiences
role conflict similar to that experienced by universities and conferences. The
Division I governance structure reinforces this conflict because it is dominated
by the major conferences and their concerns. As previously stated, a major
concern of many conferences is the generation of revenues. 114
Although the NCAA manual contains hundreds of pages of rules, the
small size of the NCAA's enforcement staff impairs its ability to detect
violations of those rules. As a result, the NCAA relies mainly on informants
and institutional self-reporting to apprise it of alleged violations. 115 Once the
NCAA becomes aware of potential violations, lack of judicially enforceable
discovery power limits its ability to gather and verify pertinent information. 116
To lessen the impact of these limitations, the NCAA encourages schools to
cooperate with NCAA investigators in return for reduced penalties. 117 NCAA
penalties for the most flagrant violations usually result only in the loss of
scholarships and recruiting visits and perhaps probation for the offending
university. 118 Commentators use the NCAA's inadequate detection methods
and light penalties as evidence of its lack of commitment to the enforcement of
its rules, academic or otherwise. 119
The NCAA's national character makes it the ideal institution to
promulgate and enforce uniform rules that encourage educational primacy.
However, as an entity, the NCAA profits from activities that threaten
educational primacy. In fact, the NCAA is financially dependent upon its
basketball tournament, which capitalizes upon all three threats to educational
112. Id. at art. 2.5.
113. These standards require athletes to achieve a specified SAT/ACT score and high school
GPA to participate in NCAA competition. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 14.3.1.1.1. Less
rigorous standards apply to junior college transfer students. Id. at art. 14.5.4.1.
114. SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 16, at 16.
115. SPERBER, supra note 27, at 316.
116. Id. at 246-247.
117. Id. at 317.
118. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 219.
119. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 25-26.
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primacy. 120 Strict enforcement of the principle of educational primacy by the
NCAA would force the organization into financial ruin.
Since a university's primary purpose is to educate its students, the
university is the ideal entity to police the principle of educational primacy.
However, historically and even today universities have not adequately done
this, absent outside intervention. Since conferences and the NCAA are
financially dependent on activities that compete with the principle of
educational primacy, they do not and cannot be expected to vigorously police
or enforce the principle of educational primacy. To summarize, self-interest
and conflicting goals have prevented all three internal governance structures
from adequately policing the principle. The next section discusses how
external governance structures have dealt with these problems.
B. External Governance
Internal governance structures regulate both the economic and educational
aspects of intercollegiate athletics. This conflicting role, in which economic
concerns often take precedence over student-athletes' educational concerns,
supports an increased role for external regulation. Yet, courts and legislatures
have largely declined invitations to intervene in university/student-athlete
relations. 121
With the exception of Title IX, Congress does not interfere with the
NCAA's regulation of the university/student-athlete relationship. To further
insure this relationship against congressional intervention, the NCAA
maintains an office in Washington, D.C., which employs full-time
lobbyists. 122 At the state level, legislative intervention is generally limited to
the regulation of student-athlete relationships with sports agents 123 and
funding restrictions for college athletics programs. 124
120. Suggs, supra note 42. See generally Budget Supports New NCAA Structure, NCAA.oRG,
available at http://www.ncaa.org/about/finances.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
121. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 195-196.
122. Id. at 196.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., TEX CONST. art. VII, § 17 (Vernon 1995) (prohibiting the use of certain state
appropriations for facilities used solely for intercollegiate athletics); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-62-801
(Michie 2001) (requiring limitations on the use of university general funds to support intercollegiate
athletics programs); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 71-203 (2000) (prohibiting the use of public funds for
athletic scholarships); R1I. GEN. LAWS § 16-59-9 (2001) (requiring auxiliary facilities of public
universities to be self-supporting); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 17:2053 (West 2000) (prohibiting private
universities from using certain funds from the state for intercollegiate athletics purposes); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN § 17:3801 (West 2000) (prohibiting the use of state educational trust funds for
intercollegiate athletics purposes); OR. REV. STAT. § 341.009 (1999) (prohibiting state appropriations
for athletic facilities for spectator sports). Some universities provide subsidies to athletics programs
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Although the threat of litigation might enhance the status of educational
primacy in college athletics programs, courts have been reluctant to hold
universities liable for the failure to educate individual student-athletes. To this
end, courts uniformly deny negligent admissions and educational malpractice
claims. 125 Difficulties in establishing educational standards, injury, causation,
and remedies are cited as reasons for courts' hostility towards these claims. 126
In addition, courts fear that allowing such claims would induce floods of
litigation by disgruntled students. 127
Contract claims can provide an alternative to educational malpractice and
negligent admissions claims. In Ross, the court noted that if Ross could
establish that the university failed to honor a specific contractual promise, a
breach of contract action might exist. 128 Commentators further suggest that
claims based on contract law's implied obligation of good faith might be
available to plaintiffs harmed by a university's failure to educate. 129 Courts,
however, warn against attempts to recast educational malpractice claims as
contract claims.130
Courts and legislatures have, for the most part, chosen to play a passive
role in the regulation of college athletics. This passiveness has, in effect,
given the NCAA virtually unlimited power over the future of college
athletics. 131 Therefore, any serious attempts to reform college athletics must
focus on the NCAA.
As the most powerful regulator of college athletics programs, the NCAA
is in a unique position to strengthen the principle of educational primacy. Yet
any attempt to strengthen educational primacy must also minimize its major
threats, i.e. competitive pressures, commercialism, and professionalism. Even
if institutional interests militate against the NCAA implementing legislation
that directly strengthens educational primacy, the NCAA should, at the very
least, take steps to ensure that future legislative amendments do not further
through related-party transactions where expenses properly associated with the athletics department
are paid by other departments within the university. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 153.
125. Hazel Glenn Beh, Student Versus University: The University's Implied Obligations of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, 59 MD. L. REv. 183,210 (2000).
126. Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the
Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 455-459 (2000).
127. Id. at 458.
128. Ross, 957 F.2d at 417.
129. Beh, supra note 125, at 196-98.
130. Ross, 957 F.2dat416.
131. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that because the NCAA is not a state actor, its actions are
not subject to constitutional constraints. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179,
191-99 (1988).
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weaken the principle. Amateurism deregulation is an area in which the NCAA
can implement this laudable goal.
V. AMATEURISM DEREGULATION
The NCAA's definition of "amateur" cries out for reform. Under present
rules, athletes lose their amateur status when they sign a contract to play for a
professional team, even if they never in fact play for the team.132 Ironically, a
U.S. athlete that plays on a professional team in one sport remains eligible to
play a different sport.133 Similarly, many international athletes with previous
participation on international "professional teams" 134 remain eligible.
135
Growing dissatisfaction with the inequities and inconsistencies in the current
NCAA amateurism rules recently propelled amateurism deregulation to the
forefront of Division I's legislative agenda.
Division I amateurism reform suggestions boil down to essentially two
proposals. The first proposal would allow enrolled student-athletes to receive
payments in addition to a full grant-in-aid without forfeiting eligibility. 136 The
second proposal would allow prospective student-athletes to retain eligibility
132. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 12.1.1(c). However, it is possible for institutions to
obtain restoration of eligibility for athletes who have lost their amateur status. Id. at 14.12.1.
133. Id. at art. 12.1.2.
134. A professional team is defined as any organized team that:
(a) Is a member of a recognized professional sports organization;
(b) Is directly supported or sponsored by a professional team or professional sports organization, except
as permitted in 12.6.1.8 (see also Bylaw 12.6.1.1);
(c) Is a member of a playing league that is directly supported or sponsored by a professional team or
professional sports organization (see also Bylaw 12.6.1.1);
(d) Has an athlete receiving for his or her participation any kind of payment, directly or indirectly, from a
professional team or professional sports organization (see also Bylaw 12.6.1.1).
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 12.02.4.
135. See generally Brown, supra note 9, available at
http:llwww.ncaa.org/news/2000/20000731/active/3716nOl.htinl. Due to differences in international
amateurism standards, the NCAA determines an international athlete's amateur status using an "intent
to professionalize" test, as opposed to strict adherence to Article 12.1.1 of the NCAA's bylaws. Gary
T. Brown, Division I Delegates Say More Con Than Pro On Amateurism Package, NCAA NEWS,
Jan. 15, 2001, available at http:/www.ncaa.org/news/2001/200101l15active/3802nO3.html. In
Europe, professional clubs sponsor youth teams where participants gradually ascend towards the
foreign equivalent of a U.S. professional team. SPERBER, supra note 27, at 236. Hence, by the time
European athletes turn nineteen, they could be already playing just one tier below their countries'
professional level. Id.
136. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATTI c ASS'N, NCAA DMsION I AMATEURISM DEREGULATION
[hereinafter DMSION I DEREGULATION], at
http://www.ncaa.orgldatabases/reports/l/200004bd/200004_dl-boardagenda-sll .htm (last visited
Jan. 30,2002).
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even if they have briefly participated on a professional team. 137 This section
evaluates the merits of both proposals and concludes that the second proposal
is more consistent with the principle of educational primacy.
The two core values of NCAA amateurism regulations are student-athlete
welfare and competitive equity. 138  Therefore, in evaluating amateurism
deregulation proposals, student-athlete welfare and competitive equity
concerns must be given considerable weight. The principle of student-athlete
welfare requires NCAA member institutions to maintain an environment in
which athletics complements rather than detracts from an athlete's educational
experience. 139 The principle of competitive equity seeks to level the playing
field among college athletics programs. 140 In the NCAA's bylaws, this
principle translates into limitations on eligibility, recruiting, funding, and
playing and practice seasons. 141
A. Pay-for-Play
To be eligible for a collegiate sports team, an athlete must be considered
an "amateur." 142 Under current NCAA bylaws, athletes lose eligibility in a
given sport once they accept compensation for participating in that sport. 143
These bylaws seek to ensure that institutions maintain "a clear line of
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 2.2.1.
140. Id. at art. 2.10.
141. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 218.
142. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 12.01.1. NCAA regulations state that amateur status
may be lost where an athlete:
(a) Uses his or her athletic skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport;
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate
athletics participation;
(c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, regardless of its legal
enforceability or any consideration received;
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other form of financial
assistance from a professional sports organization based upon athletics skill or participation, except as
permitted by NCAA rules and regulations;
(e) Competes on any professional athletics team and knows (or had reason to know) that the team is a
professional athletics team (per Bylaw 12.02.4), even if no pay or remuneration for expenses was
received; or
(f) Enters into a professional draft or an agreement with an agent (see also Bylaw 12.2.4.2. 1).
Id. at art. 12.1.1.
143. Id. The NCAA exempts institutional athletic scholarships from the definition of "pay" for
athletics skill. Id. at art. 12.01.4.
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demarcation between college athletics and professional sports."'144
U.S. colleges have long compensated student-athletes for their athletic
abilities. In the late-1800s teams regularly paid participating athletes, some of
whom were not even students. 145 In response to these and other abuses,
NCAA members adopted the Sanity Code in 1948, which prohibited financial
aid based solely on athletic ability.146  A mere three years later, the
membership abandoned the code as unworkable. 147 Today, student-athletes
may receive athletic scholarships covering an institution's "cost of
attendance." 148  In essence, athletic scholarships constitute a form of
compensation based on athletic skill.149 Hence, under the plain meaning of
the NCAA's rules, athletic scholarship recipients are not, and never have been,
true amateurs.
The proposed changes to the current compensatory scheme would allow
student-athletes to accept compensation in excess of the cost of attendance.
These proposals stem primarily from an attempt by the NCAA to provide
incentives for elite athletes to delay their professional sports careers until
graduation.150 By sanctioning supplemental income, these proposals also
respond to the argument that big-time college athletics financially exploit
student-athletes, many of whom come from low-income families.
The immediate financial rewards of playing professionally prompt many
elite basketball players to begin professional careers prior to graduation. The
early exit of these players guts college basketball rosters and injures the
quality of the college game. 151 Pay-for-play supporters believe that providing
athletes with additional financial incentives will encourage them to delay their
professional careers until after graduation. 152
Elite college basketball players generate revenues for their schools that far
exceed the value of a full grant-in-aid. 153 While the typical grant-in-aid is
worth only $30,000,154 a top player might generate as much as $1 million in
144. Id. at art. 12.01.2.
145. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 7.
146. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 1, at 43-44.
147. Id. at 46-47.
148. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 15.01.7. The cost of attendance includes tuition and
fees, room and board, books, supplies, transportation, and related expenses. Id. at art. 15.02.2.
149. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 1, at 2.
150. Id. at 143. See also Brown, supra note 7.
151. Suggs, supra note 42, atA53.
152. SAcK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 1, at 143.
153. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 11.
154. See, e.g., DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 132.
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revenue annually. 155 Although reformers would like student-athletes to reap
more of the fruits of their labor, current NCAA amateurism regulations would
prevent this from occurring. Currently, the only way to provide athletes with
compensation more closely related to their market value is through covert
payments.156
Reformers propose several methods by which the NCAA might allow
student-athletes to legitimately receive additional athletically-related
compensation ("pay-for-play"). These methods include part-time
employment, stipends, loans, and prize money. Although athletes could
theoretically undertake part-time employment to supplement their athletic
scholarships, team and academic activities would prevent many of them from
working the hours needed to earn significant additional income. In fact,
current NCAA rules limit student-athletes' earnings from employment to a
mere $2000.00 during the academic year. 157 Although stipends would not
present the scheduling difficulties of part-time employment, most athletics
programs lack the funding to provide stipends. Loans based on an athlete's
anticipated earnings would present similar funding concerns. Prize money
from athletic contests is another way in which student-athletes could receive
supplemental income. Indeed, this might be the most feasible reform since it
does not present scheduling difficulties of employment, nor does it present the
same funding difficulties of stipend or loan-based reforms. Nevertheless
because stipends and loans are the most hotly debated pay-for-play proposals,
the scope of this section will be limited to these two particular forms of
additional compensation.
Pay-for-play would clearly benefit student-athletes financially. However,
there are several reasons why pay-for-play falls short as an approach to
amateurism deregulation. First, pay-for-play weakens the principle of
educational primacy by strengthening its threats. Second, the proposals will
155. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 11.
156. See generally Press Release, NCAA Infractions Appeals Committee, Former Southeast
Missouri University Head Men's Basketball Coach Public Infractions Appeals Committee Report
(Jan. 11, 1999), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/releases/makepage.cgi/infractions/1999011101in.htm#Violations; Suggs, supra
note 42. In 1982, "signing bonuses" for top high school prospects were in the five figures.
ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 24. See also Jerry Kirshenbaum, Digger's Non-bombshell, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 5, 1982, at 10. The estimated black-market rate for elite college football players
is purported to be around $200,000.00. Tim Sullivan, College Football Players Seek Share of Profits,
GANNET NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 20, 2001, at ARC. Covert payments may take the form of cash
payments, cars, apartments, or jobs for parents. SPERBER, supra note 27, at 250-51. Commentators
suggest that financial need and the perception of exploitation might influence an athlete's willingness
to accept covert payments. Davis, supra note 89, at 223-24.
157. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 15.2.6.1.
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not deter athletes from leaving college early to compete on professional teams.
Third, the financial implications of pay-for-play make its implementation
impractical for the vast majority of institutions.
Pay-for-play will strengthen all of the major threats to educational
primacy: competitive pressures, commercialism, and professionalism. Pay-
for-play will intensify competitive pressures on student-athletes to the extent
that performance expectations increase along with the athletes' compensation.
That is, coaches might expect a higher level of performance and student-
athletes might feel obligated to provide a higher level of performance if they
are being paid to play. Furthermore, any attempts to raise the funds necessary
to finance stipends or loans might result in a corresponding increase in
commercialism. As previously stated, commercialism compounds the
pressure to win and intrudes upon the athletes' academic lives. Intense
competitive pressures can increase the recruitment of academically-
underprepared, professionalized athletes. In light of these facts, it is unlikely
that pay-for-play will enhance student-athletes' overall educational experience
in accordance with the principle of student-athlete welfare.
Furthermore, pay-for-play will not encourage student-athletes with
professional potential to delay their professional careers. First, colleges will
never be able to compete with professional teams in terms of players' salaries.
Second, offering athletes additional compensation as an incentive to remain in
college assumes that the athletes enrolled in college to receive an education.
Such an assumption ignores the fact that many elite athletes attend college for
exposure and athletic training, rather than for educational purposes. 158 If a
player's main goal in attending college is to obtain sufficient exposure and
training to launch a professional career, then it is unlikely that the player will
remain in college once the opportunity for a professional career presents itself.
Moreover, practical considerations would prevent the widespread
implementation of pay-for-play. That is, inadequate funding would prevent
most universities from offering athletes modest stipends, let alone amounts
sufficient to cause them to defer potentially lucrative professional careers.
Many schools lack sufficient funding for basic athletic scholarships. 5 9 Add to
the cost of scholarships, the cost of student-athlete salaries and the cost of
complying with the tax and labor laws implicated by an employer-employee
relationship, and many schools would be forced to drop their athletics
158. SPERBER, supra note 27, at 8.
159. See, e.g., Athletics Task Force Report Recommends Restructuring of Sports Program,
Finances, Academic Support, VIRGINIA.EDU (Apr. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Athletics Task Force]
(detailing the task force's recommendations to decrease funding for athletic scholarships to reduce the
athletics department's anticipated deficits), at
http://www.virginia.edu/topnews/releases200l/athletics-April-6-2OOI.html.
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programs altogether. Even schools that currently profit from their athletics
programs would be unlikely to break even in a pay-for-play regime.
Under the current amateurism regulations, the wealthiest athletics
programs tend to field the most competitive teams. This occurs because
recruiting top athletes usually requires a further commitment to provide the
academic services, coaching staffs, and facilities necessary to support these
athletes. Pay-for-play would further increase the costs of operating a
competitive athletics program, thereby exacerbating existing competitive
inequities.
Although pay-for-play might lessen the perception of student-athlete
exploitation, it fails to address several other pertinent issues. That is pay-for-
play does not advance student-athletes' educational welfare, nor does it
promote competitive equity. Indeed, the implementation of such a proposal
would weaken educational primacy and widen the competitive gap between
the rich and poor athletics programs. Given the destructive effects that pay-
for-play will wreak on student-athlete education and athletics departments'
finances, this sort of approach to amateurism deregulation should not even be
seriously considered.
B. Former Professional Eligibility
NCAA regulations do not allow an athlete to correct a mistaken decision
to pursue a professional sports career. 160 NCAA amateurism regulations state
that an athlete who signs a contract to play on a professional team or who
knowingly competes on a professional team forfeits his or her eligibility. 16 1 In
effect, participation on a professional team is used as a proxy for athletes with
skills too advanced for intercollegiate competition. 162  The amateurism
regulations attempt to foster competitive equity among college athletics teams
by eliminating this class of athletes from the college recruiting pool.
The NCAA's Division I Management Council recently reviewed an
amateurism deregulation package which included a proposal that would give
high school graduates the option to compete on professional teams for a
limited time without forfeiting NCAA eligibility ("the proposal"). 163 The
proposal is based on the "Tennis Rule," which allows tennis players to
160. See, e.g., Shelton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir.
1976) (upholding the NCAA's amateurism regulations, which made Shelton ineligible, despite
Shelton's argument that he was unduly influenced to sign the professional contract).
161. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 12.1.1.
162. See generally DIVISION I DEREGULATION, supra note 136, at
http://www.ncaa.org/databases/reports/l/200004bd/200004_dl-board_agenda-s I .htm.
163. AEC Cabinet Amends, supra note 6.
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compete in "organized competition" 164 for up to one year after graduating
from high school. 165 Under the proposal, athletes who compete in "organized
competition" for more than one year would forfeit all Division I eligibility.
166
When the proposal was first introduced, it extended the Tennis Rule to all
sports. 167 However, the Academics/Eligibility/Compliance Cabinet 168 (AEC
Cabinet) recently recommended the exclusion of basketball from the proposal,
citing the sport's unique susceptibility to third party influences, e.g. agents,
boosters, and non-scholastic coaches. 169
Men's basketball boasts the NCAA's lowest graduation rates.170 As such,
men's basketball players stand to gain immensely from any proposal that
bolsters educational primacy. As this section will soon demonstrate, allowing
former professionals to retain eligibility will bolster educational primacy.
Therefore, basketball should not be excluded from the proposal.
The current amateurism rules regarding professional athletes were
intended to prevent schools from recruiting "ringers" whose sole purpose for
matriculation was to play sports.171 Historically, athletes were allowed to
matriculate one day and play the next, regardless of their academic
standing. 172  Today, NCAA eligibility and transfer regulations place
limitations on such practices. 173
Allowing athletes to experiment briefly with professional sports careers
prior to enrolling in college will advance student-athlete welfare in several
ways. First, granting former professionals eligibility will promote educational
primacy. Second, it will expand the number of athletic opportunities available
to athletes immediately after high school. Lastly, former professional
eligibility will provide athletes with a valuable bargaining tool. 174
164. Organized competition includes athletic activities where official score is kept, admission is
charged, game officials are used, or where a team is privately or commercially sponsored. NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 14.2.3.5.3.
165. Id. at art. 14.2.3.2.
166. AEC Cabinet Amends, supra note 6, at 1.
167. Id.
168. The AEC Cabinet is responsible for reviewing Division I legislation and making
recommendations to the Management Council regarding academic, eligibility, and compliance issues.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 21.6.6.2.2.
169. AEC Cabinet Amends, supra note 6, at 1.
170. ZIMBALIsT, supra note 3, at 39.
171. AEC Cabinet Amends, supra note 6, at 1.
172. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at21.
173. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 14.5.1 (stating that transfer students must complete
one academic year in residence to become eligible for competition).
174. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 197-198.
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The proposal will promote educational primacy since, like redshirting, it
requires an institution to make a considerable investment in an athlete's
education before the institution can benefit from the athlete's athletic skills. 175
The proposal's year in residence requirement will require former professionals
to immediately forfeit one full year of exposure. 176 This waiting period would
dissuade all but the most academically-inclined former professionals from
joining college teams. 177
Former professional eligibility will also advance student-athlete welfare
by increasing the number of athletics options available to recent high school
graduates. Under current NCAA regulations, participation on a college team
is no longer an option for an athlete who is considered to be a professional.
Hence most high school graduates must choose between college teams and
professional teams, without having experienced either. Permitting athletes to
compete professionally for a brief period would improve their ability to
evaluate their potential for and interest in a professional sports career. Perhaps
after having actually experienced the rigors of a professional sports career,
some athletes might decide that pursuing a college education is more
consistent with their long-term goals.
Additionally, former professional eligibility will improve athletes'
bargaining power with professional leagues. 178 Currently, an athlete forfeits
eligibility by entering a professional draft prior to enrolling in college. 179 If
professional athletes could retain eligibility, they could use it to obtain
negotiation leverage with professional teams. 180 That is, a drafted athlete
could more confidently reject an inadequate offer from a professional team in
favor of a college team since, under the proposal, being drafted would no
longer render the athlete ineligible. If a professional team was sufficiently
interested in retaining the athlete's services, it might improve its offer to
prevent the athlete from joining a college team. 181  The proposal also
175. Taylor & Traub, supra note 44, at 83.
176. Brown, supra note 9, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20000731/active/3716nO1.html.
177. Athletes with professional aspirations covet playing time and media coverage, also known
as "exposure." SPERBER, supra note 27, at 230.
178. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 197-198.
179. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 12.1.1(f). Once enrolled, a basketball player may
enter a professional draft once without forfeiting eligibility, provided that the player is not drafted.
Id. at art. 12.2.4.2.1.
180. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 197-198.
181. John Smallwood, Why is All the Outrage Saved for the NBA, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 4,
2000 (noting that Major League Baseball teams pay draftees considering college more money to
discourage them from going to college immediately after high school), available at
http://www.lexis.com. See also, Gary Lundy, Baseball System Does Not Favor Burke's Return to
[Vol. 12:595
QUID PRO QUO
minimizes the effect that former professional eligibility will have on the
competitive equity of intercollegiate athletics. The one-year waiting period
will curtail schools' recruitment of ringers. Moreover, by limiting the
experimental professional period to one year, the proposal will have a minimal
effect on competitive equity. That is, an athlete engaging in such a brief
professional sports career is not likely to have gained a substantial competitive
advantage.
The proposal further addresses competitive equity concerns by eliminating
the disparate treatment of U.S. athletes vis-a-vis their international
counterparts. In contrast to the status quo, the proposal would hold United
States and international athletes to the same amateurism standards.18 2
Presently, since United States and international amateurism definitions differ,
the NCAA determines an international athlete's amateur status primarily by
his or her "intent to professionalize." 183 Because amateurism is defined more
expansively abroad, this test allows some international athletes to retain
eligibility even though they have had extensive involvement with professional
teams. 184 Under the proposal, the only inquiry for both U.S. and international
athletes would be the length of the athletes' participation on a professional
team. 185 Thus, international athletes with more than one year of participation
on a foreign professional team would be ineligible for NCAA competition.
The proposal would also provide important institutional benefits. That is,
it would simplify the amateurism determination process by retiring the elusive
"intent to professionalize" test. Furthermore, the proposal would be less costly
to administer than the current amateurism regime since fewer reinstatement
requests would be made. 186 A pay-for-play system, on the other hand, would
substantially increase costs. Hence, the proposal, unlike pay-for-play, would
Vols, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERV., May 22, 2001 (explaining that college baseball players that
wait until senior year to enter the draft usually receive less money), available at
http://www.lexis.com.
182. Brown, supra note 9, available at
http:/www.ncaa.orglnews/2000/2000073 1/active/3716nOl.html. Current amateurism regulations are
more strictly enforced against domestic athletes. Id.
183. Brown, supra note 135, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010115/active/3802n03.html.
184. For instance, if an international athlete had played on a youth team funded by a professional
sports organization from age 13 to 18, the athlete could retain eligibility so long as he or she did not
demonstrate the intent to professionalize. Brown, supra note 9, available at
http://www.ncaa.orglnews/2000/20000731/active/3716nOl.html. A similarly situated U.S. athlete
would forfeit all college eligibility. Id.
185. DmsION I DEREGULATION, supra note 136, at
http:llwww.ncaa.orgfdatabases/reports/l/200004bd/200004 dl board agenda-sl 1.htm.
186. Brown, supra note 135, available at
http://www.ncaa.orglnews/2001/20010115/active/3802n03.html.
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promote educational primacy, minimize competitive inequities, and save
money.
Still, opponents of former professional eligibility advance several
arguments against the proposal. First, they very persuasively argue that the
proposal will encourage athletes to postpone college. 187 Indeed, the proposal
probably will encourage some athletes to postpone their college educations,
i.e. those with no immediate interest in higher education. Contrastingly, the
proposal is not likely to have any effect on those athletes with a more intense
desire to pursue a college degree. For those athletes that initially, but
mistakenly, postpone college, the proposal would provide them with a limited
opportunity to correct their initial decision to choose athletics over education.
Second, opponents of former professional eligibility argue that the
proposal will increase the influence of third parties in the recruiting process. 188
As previously stated, the most successful athletes would be unlikely to play for
college teams under the conditions imposed by the proposal. Former
professionals who do opt to play on college teams are likely to be those with
spent ambition for a professional sports career. As such, these athletes would
be attending college for primarily academic reasons. Consequently, the
influence of third parties would be curtailed by the athletes' academic
aspirations and the target schools' academic offerings.
Lastly, former professional eligibility opponents argue that
implementation of the proposal will further undermine competitive equity. 189
However, the proposal's one-year limitation on professional careers coupled
with its one-year waiting period will minimize, if not eliminate, any
competitive advantage gained by former professionals. Clearly the highest
caliber athletes are not going to trade in their paid professional careers for a
position on a less handsomely remunerated college team.
All competitive endeavors suffer from inherent inequities and college
athletics is not an exception to this proposition. The proposal minimizes most
of the competitive advantage that a brief professional career could produce.
And even if implementation of the proposal would widen the competitive gap
between athletics programs, the proposal's educational benefits clearly exceed
any of its drawbacks.
The NCAA's amateurism regulations are ripe for reform. Given the
present financial state of college athletics, pay-for-play is not a viable reform.
187. Welch Suggs, Divisions I and II Diverge on Amateurism Proposals, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Jan. 19, 2001, at A38.
188. Brown, supra note 135, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010115/active/3802n03.html.
189. Id.
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Former professional eligibility, on the other hand, is a viable reform that not
only promotes educational primacy, but also addresses detractors' competitive
equity concerns. If implemented, the proposal coupled with the opportunities
provided by the NBA's fledgling developmental league, could restore
educational primacy to college basketball.
VI. THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL DEVELOPMENT LEAGUE
College basketball teams have long served as the NBA's de facto minor
league. The most recent trend in college basketball is that an increasing
number of players are abandoning college teams for the NBA prior to
completing their degrees and prior to attaining NBA caliber basketball skills.
NBA officials blame the proliferation of underdeveloped talent for the
league's declining quality of play and waning popularity. 190 With no end in
sight, the present trend among elite college players promises to further saturate
the ranks of the NBA with underdeveloped talent.191
To better accommodate its developmental needs, the NBA plans to launch
the National Basketball Development League (NBDL) in eight southeastern
cities beginning in November 2001.192 The NBDL will serve as the NBA's
official minor league. 193 Unlike college teams, the NBDL will give the NBA
more control over player development and, unlike existing basketball minor
leagues, the NBDL will have the full financial and marketing support of the
NBA behind it.
NBDL officials maintain that the new league will not compete with
college teams. 194 However, because the NBDL will be recruiting college-aged
players displaying a level of talent just below that of NBA players, it will
inevitably skim talent from college teams. 195 The NBDL's minimum age
requirement is the only factor that will prevent its recruiting efforts from
completely overlapping those of college teams. At minimum, a NBDL player
must be either twenty years old or at least eighteen if the player was
190. Sam Smith, Here's a Speedy Cure For What Ails Today's NBA, CHI. TRiB., Jan. 7, 2001, at
8.
191. Ronald Tillery, Youngsters' Talent Too Good to Ignore, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
June 28,2000, at Cl.
192. NBDL Background Information, NBA.coM, at
http://www.nba.com/news/nbdl-info_001229.html?nav=RElatedLinkList (last visited Jan. 30,2002).
193. The league will serve as a feeder system for the NBA, but the developmental teams will not
have a direct affiliation with specific NBA franchises. Id.
194. John Millea, Running the Option, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), June 28, 2000, at 9C.
195. Thomas Krause & Phillip Ramati, City Works to be Finalist for NBDL Team, MACON
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 27, 2001, available at http://www.westlaw.com.
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previously drafted by a NBA team and subsequently cut. 1 9 6 The NBDL will
not impose an upper age limit.197
The NBDL will offer those players seeking professional basketball careers
a viable alternative to college basketball teams. Recognizing the potential
threat that the NBDL poses to the future of college basketball, some coaches
openly question the league's professed desire not to compete with college
basketball. 198  These coaches' sentiments were expressed by Duke
University's famed basketball coach Mike Krzyzewski who commented that
"[t]here's no question [that] the league will compete with college
[basketball]."' 199 Krzyzewski further commented that he wasn't "sure how
much it will hurt [college basketball]. ,200
A. The Benefits of the NBDL
The NBA recruits heavily from college teams. Consequently, many elite
basketball players see college, not as an educational opportunity, but as the
gateway to a professional basketball career. 20 1 So it is not surprising that the
vast majority of these players either leave college early or forgo college
altogether. 20 2
From an educational primacy standpoint, the NBDL will help college
basketball more than it will hurt it. That is, the league will siphon off those
players with little or no desire to receive a college education. Contrastingly,
those players choosing to attend college will be more likely to be there
because they want to earn a degree, and not because college is the only viable
route to the NBA. Furthermore, the inclusion of basketball in the former
professional eligibility proposal will allow players with short-lived NBDL
careers to remain eligible for college teams. As previously stated, these
players will possess a similar commitment to education.
Lacking the drawbacks of college basketball teams, the NBDL
promises to become the route of choice for athletes with NBA aspirations.
Unlike college players, NBDL players will be able to receive compensation
196. NBDL Fact Sheet, NBA.COM, at
http://www.nba.com/news/nbdlfaq_O 10103.html?nav=ArticleList (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
197. Id.
198. Gene Sapakoff, The Eye of Basketball's Big Storm, POST AND COURIER (Charleston, S.C.),
Jan. 19, 2001, at C1.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. SPERBER, supra note 27, at 8.
202. Cf Lundy, supra note 181 (noting that college baseball players with Major League potential
are encouraged to leave college prior to completing their degrees).
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for their athletic skill without risking their status on the team. The average
NBDL salary will be approximately $30,000.00,203 the value of a typical
financial aid package.204 However, NBDL players will not be burdened with
the daily responsibilities of dual athlete and student status. Some of the
NBDL's critics argue that the league will leave many players without a future
and without a degree.20 5 Yet this type of criticism ignores the reality that,
under the status quo, many basketball players never graduate and that many of
those who do graduate lack the basic skills that a college degree is supposed to
represent.206
In addition to salaries, the NBDL will also rival college teams in exposure
opportunities. Each of the NDBL's teams will play a fifty-six game regular
season followed by a playoff.20 7 Current NCAA regulations prevent college
teams from playing more than twenty-eight regular season games.20 8 The
NBDL's partnerships with SFX Entertainment, a worldwide concert promoter,
and ESPN, a major sports network, will ensure that the teams receive adequate
media exposure.209 In fact, some games will be broadcast via television,
203. Mark Asher, Minor League Gives the NBA Major Potential, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2001, at
D9.
204. DUDERSTADT, supra note 12, at 132. However, the value of the typical financial aid
package decreases considerably when one considers the fact that many elite college athletes do not
receive the full value of their financial package's educational component. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3,
at 46-48.
205. Cf Stephen R. Hagwell, Exploitation or Opportunity, NCAA NEWS, Dec. 1, 1997
(criticizing the former CBA's plan to draft high school athletes), available at
http:llwww.ncaa.orglnews/1997/19971201/active/3443nOl.html. Top players can use the leverage
provided by college eligibility to persuade professional leagues to finance their college expenses at
the end of their professional careers. E.g., Jack Torry, Days of Reckoning, PIrSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, June 5, 2000, at C6 (detailing the terms of Pat O'Brien's contract with the Pittsburgh
Pirates, which provides for his educational expenses). Under Project 40, Major League Soccer
provides educational grants to high school graduates that postpone college. Smallwood, supra note
181; Steve Argeris & Drew Sheehan, Project 40 Lures Away Vermillion, CAVALIER DAILY
(Charlottesville, Va.), Jan. 14, 1998, available at
http://www.cavalierdaily.com/.Archivesl1998/January/14/spmls.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). To
ensure that its players have the opportunity to pursue higher education in the future, the NBDL could
implement a similar program.
206. ZIMBALIST, supra note 3, at 39-40. Still, commentators note that athletes might derive
substantial educational benefits from merely having been exposed to institutions of higher education.
Feuerherd, supra note 44.
207. NBDL Fact Sheet, supra note 196, at
http://www.nba.com/news/nbdlfaq_010103.html?nav=ArticleList (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
208. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 2, at art. 17.5.5.1. See also Brown, supra note 7 (discussing a
proposal to increase the maximum number of contests from twenty-eight to twenty-nine).
209. Ben Brazil, N. Charleston May Get NBA Minor League Team, POST AND COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Mar. 16, 2001, at Al.
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radio, and the Internet.210 Hence, the NBDL is well-positioned to offer
athletes the same opportunities for exposure that they now seek from college
teams.
The NBDL's success could wreak havoc on the finances of the NCAA and
its members. That is, as NBDL games begin to displace college games, the
NCAA's members can expect to see a corresponding decrease in their
television rights fees. To mitigate this loss of revenue, schools might be
forced to either increase fees and fund-raising or implement cost-savings
measures, such as reducing athletic scholarships or postponing capital and
personnel expenditures. 211
The rights fees from the men's basketball tournament are the NCAA's
main source of income.212 The NCAA's contract with CBS is supposed to
provide it with $6 billion in rights fees over the next eleven years. 213
However, if ratings for the tournament continue to decline with the level of
play, the NCAA might be forced to renegotiate the contract prior to its
expiration date.214
B. Potential University Responses: The Benefits of College
The NBDL could be a double-edged sword for college basketball. On the
one hand, it could help to restore educational primacy to college basketball by
siphoning off those players with no interest in a college education. On the
other hand, the league could also siphon off the potential revenue that could
have been generated by those players. However, there are several ways in
which the NCAA and its members can attempt to minimize the NBDL's
impact on college teams.
First, schools must reemphasize the importance of a college education to
high school recruits. They could do this by providing prospective student-
athletes with information on the likelihood and duration of typical professional
basketball careers. Furthermore, instead of misleading players with respect to
their prospects for a professional basketball career, schools could stress the
210. Mike Potter, Fayetteville Gets First NBDL Team, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Jan. 5,
2001, at B5.
211. Athletics Task Force, supra note 159 (discussing the athletics task force's proposal to
reduce the athletics department's anticipated deficit), at
http://www.virginia.edu/topnews/releases200l/athletics-April-6-2001 .html.
212. Suggs, supra note 42.
213. Gary T. Brown, The Money Pie: NCAA Leaders Work To Balance Campus, Association-
wide Needs, NCAA NEWS, July 3, 2000, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20000703/active/3714n0l .html.
214. David Pickle, Various Factors Lead to Dip in Final Four Television Ratings, NCAA NEWS,
Apr. 24, 2000, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2000/20000424/active/3709n 8.hml.
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need for players to have marketable skills besides athletic prowess. In so
doing, schools could emphasize the ways in which their institutions could
provide these skills.
Second, athletes must be given a meaningful opportunity to take
advantage of their schools' academic programs. At the national level, this
could be accomplished by shortening playing seasons and placing scheduling
restrictions on weekday games requiring travel.215 At the institutional level,
schools could increase support services for academically risky student-athletes
and make voluntary workouts truly voluntary.
Lastly, the NCAA should implement the former professional eligibility
proposal for all sports, including basketball. College teams will inevitably lose
some players to the NBDL. Current NCAA regulations bar all former
professionals from college teams, regardless of the duration of their
professional careers. Implementing the proposal would allow players with
short-lived NBDL careers to remain eligible for college teams. Former NBDL
players would be more likely to enroll in college to receive an education,
rather than to rehabilitate their professional sports careers. Moreover, colleges
would be able to select from an additional class of highly-skilled athletes that
would be more likely to remain with the program until graduation.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article illustrates how amateurism deregulation and the NBDL could
interact to bolster the principle of educational primacy. For basketball players
with NBA ambitions, the NBDL would be a viable, and perhaps superior,
alternative to college teams. Consequently, the presence of the NBDL could
help to ensure that players choosing to attend college will do so because they
value education, and not because college is the only viable route to the NBA.
The implementation of former professional eligibility would allow basketball
players with brief NBDL careers and renewed academic aspirations to retain
the opportunity to attend college on an athletic scholarship. Hence, former
professional eligibility and the NBDL could interact to bolster educational
primacy by making it more likely that both pre- and post-professional
basketball players would enroll in universities for academic, rather than
athletic reasons.
The NBDL will end Division I's privileged status as the NBA's minor
league. As the preferred gateway to the NBA, the NBDL could substantially
decrease the quality of the college game. To curb the corresponding loss of
revenue, elite college basketball programs will need to devise ways to compete
215. SHtULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 16, at 296.
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with the NBDL for quality basketball players. Because the financial realities
of college athletics programs will prevent them from offering pay-for-play, the
programs should focus on ways to allow basketball players to obtain more
educational value from the collegiate experience. By increasing the
educational value of the collegiate experience for basketball players, schools
would be more likely to attract skillful high school prospects whose interests
are consistent with the academic missions of colleges and universities. And
even if some prospects still choose to go to the NBDL immediately after high
school, the proposal, if implemented, would give them a chance to change
their minds.
